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Abstract 
In June 2011, the new Management at the Nigerian Nuclear Regulatory Authority (NNRA) noted with concern 
that all radiotherapy centres in Nigeria were not duly licensed for safe operation as required by the Nuclear 
Safety and Radiation Protection Act 19, of 1995 (Act) [1]. Consequently and by the powers conferred on it by 
the Act, NNRA conducted a national safety audit of all radiotherapy centres, to benchmark radiation safety in 
line with regulatory requirements. There were 9 radiotherapy centres, 5 of which were established between 2004 
- 2011 under a project between the Federal Government of Nigeria and VAMED Engineering (FGN/VAMED 
Project). Since 2004, none of the 9 had been fully authorized to operate due to their inability to comply with the 
authorization requirements, albeit some got provisional authorizations of short durations. Common non-
compliance issues included inability to meet the minimum complement of the cadres of personnel; lack of 
requisite managerial commitment and policy for effective radiation protection and safety; no equipment supplied 
under the FGN/VAMED Project was licensed for importation; and most of the new centres were sited, designed 
and constructed without requisite licenses. None of the new centres was consulted in the procurement of 
equipment. These conditions resulted to a situation of unsustainable and ineffective radiotherapy practice. 
Keywords: Radiotherapy; Brachytherapy; Oncologist; Medical Physicist; LINAC; Cobalt-60; CT-Simulator; 
Personnel Radiation Monitoring; Workplace Monitoring; Regulatory Control; licensing; authorization. 
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1. Introduction 
Radiotherapy practice in Nigeria came under regulatory control in 2001 with the establishment of NNRA. In 
2003, NNRA carried out the first national safety audit of radiotherapy centres, benchmarking radiation safety in 
line with the Nigeria Basic Ionizing Radiation Regulations (NiBIRR) [2] of 2003 and the Nigerian Radiation 
Safety in Radiotherapy Regulations, of 2006 [3].  
In 2011, NNRA conducted a second national safety audit on the then existent 9 radiotherapy centres in Nigeria: 
i Radiotherapy Department, Usmanu Danfodiyo University Teaching Hospital (UDUTH), Sokoto 
ii Radiotherapy Department, University of Benin Teaching Hospital (UBTH), Benin 
iii Radiotherapy Department, University of Nigeria Teaching Hospital (UNTH), Enugu 
iv Radiotherapy Department, Lagos University Teaching Hospital (LUTH), Lagos 
v Radiotherapy Department, National Hospital, (NHA), Abuja 
vi Radiotherapy Department, University College Hospital (UCH), Ibadan 
vii Radiotherapy Department, EkoCorp Plc Hospital (EKO), Lagos 
viii Radiotherapy Department, Ahmadu Bello University Teaching Hospital (ABUTH), Zaria 
ix Radiotherapy Department, Federal Medical Centre, (FMCG), Gombe. 
2. Major Findings 
2.1 Authorization Status 
Since 2004, none of the 9 centres were fully authorized to operate, due largely to their inability to fully comply 
with the requirements for authorization. Table 1 shows the statuses of their authorizations. 
2.2 Personnel 
Most centres did not have the minimum complement of cadres of personnel to practice e.g. Oncologists, 
Medical Physicists, 
Therapy Radiographers, Oncology Nurses etc. Furthermore, where some of these personnel existed, they were 
often not appropriately trained and certified. Consequently, key functions of the Medical Physicists for example 
were not properly fulfilled.  Some of these functions included commissioning tests of new equipment; treatment 
planning, treatment delivery, Dosimetry etc. To augment the situation, most centres resorted to the use of 
visiting experts, especially Oncologists and Medical Physicists. A summary of findings are presented in Table 2. 
Table 1: Authorization Status, December 2011 
Centre Authorization Status Remarks 
UDUTH In 2009, UDUTH was issued: 
- licence for Design and Construction 
- Licence to Import LINAC 
- Commissioning License for LINAC 
UDUTH had applied for Operation License, which 
was yet to be granted because of pending non-
compliance issues 
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UBTH UBTH had no form of authorization UBTH submitted Acceptance Test Results but no 
Commissioning Test Result 
UNTH UNTH had no form of authorizations  UNTH submitted Acceptance Tests Results but no 
Commissioning Tests Results 
LUTH - LUTH License to Use Radiation Sources 
expired in 2003 
2008, LUTH was issued: 
− Licence for Design and 
Construction of a LINAC based facility 
− Licence to Import LINAC 
− Commissioning Licence for 
LINAC 
− Provisional Operation License 
All licences expired in December 2008 
LUTH applied for renewal of Operation License for 
Radiotherapy Practice. It was not yet approved 
NHA July 2003, NHA was issued: 
− Licence for Design and 
Construction of a LINAC based facility 
− Licence to Import LINAC 
− Commissioning Licence for 
LINAC 
− Provisional Operation License 
All licences expired in December 2003  
NHA applied for renewal of its Operation License but 
this had not been renewed due to outstanding non-
compliance issues 
UCH January 2004, UCH was issued: 
− Certificate of Registration of 
Premises 
− Licence to Use Ionizing Radiation 
Sources 
Both expired in December 2004 
2010, UCH was issued: 
− Decommissioning License for 
Cobalt-60 Head 
− Import License for new Cobalt-60 
Head 
UCH had no valid authorization as at December 2011 
EKO June 2003, EKO was issued: 
− Licence to Use Radiation Sources 
− Certificate of Registration of 
Premises 
Both expired in December 2003 
August 2006, EKO was issued: 
− Decommissioning License for 
Cobalt-60 Head 
− Import License for new Cobalt-60 
Head 
EKO was yet to renew its authorizations following 
their expiry in December 2003  
ABUTH 2008 ABUTH was issued: 
− Decommissioning License for 
Cobalt-60 Head 
− Import License for new Cobalt-60 
Head.  
Only an Acceptance Test report was submitted 
FMCG 2004 FMCG was issued: 
− Licence for Design and 
Construction 
− Licence to Import Ionizing 
Radiation Source 
− Commissioning Licence 
FMCG had applied for Operation License, which was 
yet to be approved due to outstanding non-compliance 
issues 
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Table 2: Personnel by Cadres 
 
Centre 
Resident 
Oncologists 
Resident 
Medical 
Physicists 
Therapy 
Radiographers 
Oncology 
Nurses 
Technicians Remarks 
UDUTH Nil 
2 visiting 
- 2 Senior 
Registrars 
Nil 
1 Visiting  
7 Trainees 
2 Qualified 5 Qualified 
 
1 Qualified 
 
Inadequate staffing 
in both Oncologists 
and Medical 
Physicists 
UBTH 1 Resident,  
1 Visiting 
3 Senior 
Registrars 
Nil 
4 Trainees 
2 Qualified 3 Qualified 2 Qualified Inadequate staffing 
in both Oncologists 
and Medical 
Physicists 
UNTH 1 Resident 
1 Visiting 
2 Senior 
Registrars 
Nil 
6 Trainees 
2 Visiting 
5 Qualified 4 Qualified 2 Qualified Inadequate staffing 
in both Oncologists 
and Medical 
Physicists 
LUTH 5 Resident Nil 
5 Trainees 
6 Qualified 3 Qualified 1 Qualified Inadequate staffing 
in Medical Physicists 
NHA 5 Resident 2 Resident 
4 Trainees 
7 Qualified 3 Qualified 1 Qualified Adequate staffing 
UCH 7 Resident 2 Trainees 6 Qualified 5 Qualified 5 Inadequate staffing 
in Medical Physicists 
EKO 1 Resident 
2 Visiting 
2 Trainees 3 Qualified 2 Qualified 1 Inadequate staffing - 
Oncologists and 
Medical Physicists 
ABUTH 4 Resident 
6 Registrars 
6 Trainees 3 Qualified 9 Qualified 1 Inadequate staffing 
in Medical Physicists 
FMCG Nil 
2 Visiting 
2 Registrars 
2 Trainees 1 Qualified 3 Qualified 2 Qualified Inadequate staffing 
in Oncologists, 
Medical Physicists 
and Therapy 
Radiographers 
 
2.2.1 Personnel Training 
i. UDUTH 
There were no qualified Resident Oncologists or Medical Physicists. There were visiting Oncologists and 
Medical Physicists. Most staff in these cadres were newly employed trainees incapable of independent decision 
making. UDUTH was however conducting training analysis toward the development of a comprehensive 
training programme to ensure sustainability of practice. 
ii. UBTH 
There was 1 qualified Oncologist, who was complemented by other visiting Oncologists. All Medical Physicists 
were newly employed and were undergoing or were due to commence professional training. The situation was 
compounded by the fact that there was no adequate arrangement for the use of visiting Medical Physicists. 
There was plan for 1 Oncologist and 1 Medical Physicist to proceed overseas for a 6 month professional 
training. UBTH had employed nearly all the necessary personnel required to practice, but with little training and 
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no relevant experience, they could be ineffective for a sustainable practice. 
iii. UNTH 
UNTH had 1 qualified Oncologist who was complemented by visiting Oncologists. All Medical Physicists were 
newly employed and were still trainees. There were visiting Medical Physicists who both trained the new 
recruits and assisted in routine operations. The trainees, with little or no relevant training, experience or 
certification, could not carry out effective practice. UNTH indicated it was doing a training analysis and had a 
training programme to fully develop the capacity of its personnel. 
iv. LUTH 
The team of Oncologists were all well qualified and experienced. However the team of Medical Physicists were 
all not certified and they did not have the benefit of visiting Medical Physicists. It was indicated that some of 
their personnel were overseas for various trainings related to the LINAC and ancillary equipment. LUTH further 
indicated that it was in contact with equipment manufacturers for the retraining of staff on proper use of its 
Treatment Planning System (TPS). LUTH indicated that it would hire and adequately train new nurses. LUTH 
had a training programme for staff development. 
v. NHA 
NHA had a well-developed programme of training and retraining of its staff and had almost all the necessary 
personnel required for radiotherapy practice. However, most of the equipment were not in operation to fully 
utilize the available manpower. At the time of the audit, the facility was expected to undergo further structural 
modification in readiness for the installation of a new unit. 
vi. UCH 
Except for the Medical Physicists and Technicians, all other personnel showed evidence of adequate training, 
qualification and professional certification. The Medical Physicists needed clinical training and certification, 
whilst the Technicians needed to show evidence of training on the Cobalt-60 and ancillary equipment. 
vii. EKO 
Except for the Oncologist, little evidence of trainings was provided for the other personnel, especially the 
Medical Physicist. Furthermore, because of the absence of a concrete arrangement for visiting Medical 
Physicists, the training of at least 2 Medical Physicists was imperative. 
viii. ABUTH 
The ABUTH team of Oncologists were all well qualified and experienced. However, all the Medical Physicists 
were not certified and there were no visiting Medical Physicists. ABUTH was aware of the key role of Medical 
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Physicists and indicated that some of them were due for specialized training overseas. 
ix. FMCG 
There existed a programme of training and retraining of all staff. FMCG also had an on-going technical 
cooperation Project with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which had a component for staff 
training through fellowships for Oncologists, Medical Physicists, Biomedical Engineers and Nurses. 
2.3 Facility Design 
All the facilities were purpose built in accordance with manufacturers’ specifications and consistent with the 
facility designs submitted to the NNRA in support of their applications for authorization. Provisions were made 
for Examination Rooms; CT-Simulator Rooms; Mould Rooms; Treatment Planning Rooms; Treatment Rooms, 
and Waiting Areas. For ABUTH and EKO, the facility designs were for Cobalt-60 based radiotherapy, whilst 
the others were designed for LINAC. Additionally, NHA and FMCG also had purpose-built Brachytherapy 
Units. Meeting the design specifications was relatively easy as they were done by the equipment manufacturers. 
All new facilities had CCTV camera and audio communication systems to monitor patients. Door interlocks 
were provided to prevent unauthorized access. All doors were lead lined and some had maze that provided 
additional shielding. 
2.4 Equipment 
2.4.1 Equipment - UDUTH 
All the external beam therapy and associated equipment were supplied by the Federal Government under the 
FGN/VAMED Project. The equipment were new and all the relevant manuals related to them were available. 
The equipment included imaging equipment - CT Simulator; Computerized TPS; LINAC; Quality Control 
Equipment; and Radiation Safety Equipment 
Table 3: Specifications of the LINAC and CT-Simulator are as listed below: 
Equipment 
Type 
Manufacturer/Year Model  Serial No Max 
Output 
Max. 
Output 
Exposure/ 
Day 
Linear 
Accelerator 
Elekta Ltd, /2008 Elekta 
Precise 
Treatment 
System  
151715 15 MV 15MeV 10 - 15 
CT 
Simulator 
GE Hangwei 
Medical Systems, 
/2006 
2247010 173155HM3 140KV 350 mAs 10 - 15 
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Equipment were prototype tested subject to IEC and ISO standards. Installation and functional details were 
provided for the LINAC, CT-Simulator, Mould Room Equipment and TPS. Quality control equipment included 
a number of Ion Chambers, recently cross calibrated during acceptance/commissioning test. There were also 
Water and Solid Phantoms, Digital Thermometers and Barometers, and Radiation Check Sources. Radiation 
safety equipment included Survey Meters and bleeper personnel dosimeters for area survey and personnel 
radiation monitoring. 
2.4.2 Equipment UBTH 
Equipment were supplied under the FGN/VAMED Project. They were new and all the relevant manuals related 
to them were available. These included Imaging equipment - CT Simulator; Computerized TPS; LINAC; 
Quality Control Equipment; and Radiation Safety Equipment. 
Table 4: Specifications of Imaging Equipment and LINAC are listed below: 
 
Equipment were prototype tested to IEC and ISO standards. Installation and functional details were however not 
provided. Quality control equipment were available and comprised a number of Ion Chambers and 
Electrometers, which were last calibrated in November 2007 and were overdue for recalibration by November 
2009. Also available were Water and Soild Phantoms, Digital Barometers, Thermometers, Radiation Check 
Sources, etc. Radiation Safety Equipment included Tandem Survey Meter and personnel dosimeters for area 
survey/radiation monitoring. Quality Assurance Programme was yet to develop a procedure to ensure a 
consistent and safe fulfilment of the dose prescription and minimal personnel and public exposure. The main 
areas for the programme include clinical policies, treatment planning and delivery, a quality control programme 
for machine and equipment performance, maintenance programmes and investigative procedures for accidental 
medical exposures. 
2.4.3 Equipment - UNTH 
Equipment were supplied under the FGN/VAMED Project. They were new and all the relevant manuals related 
to them were available.  
They included CT-Simulator, Computerized TPS, LINAC, Quality Control and Radiation Safety Equipment. 
They were all prototype tested to IEC and ISO standards and their Installation and functional details were 
provided. 
Equipment 
Type 
Manufacturer/Year Model Serial No. Max 
output 
Max. 
Output 
Linear 
Accelerator 
Elekta Ltd, /2008 Elekta Precise 
Treatment System  
151716 15MV 15MeV 
CT Simulator GE Hangwei Medical 
Systems, /2007 
5143658 175887HM9 140KV 440mAs 
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Table 5: Specifications of the Imaging Equipment and LINAC are as listed below: 
Equipment 
Type 
Manufacturer/Year Model  Serial No. Max 
output 
Max. 
output 
Linear 
Accelerator 
Elekta Ltd, /2005 Elekta Precise 
Treatment System  
151315 15MV 15MeV 
TPS Elekta Ltd, Precision Plan XN0004C --- -- 
CT Simulator GE Hangwei Medical 
Systems, /2005 
2247010 12346HMD 140KV 350mAs 
 
Quality control equipment included Ion Chambers cross calibrated during acceptance/commissioning tests in 
August 2011. Also available were Water and Soild Phantoms, Digital Barometers and Thermoeters, Check 
Sources, etc. Radiation monitoring equipment was a Survey Meter with a valid calibration date. 
2.4.4 Equipment - LUTH 
All equipment were supplied by the Federal Government under the FGN/VAMED Project. They were new but 
not all the relevant manuals related to them were available. They included CT Simulator, TPS, LINAC, QC and 
Radiation Safety Equipment. 
Table 6: Specifications of the Imaging Equipment and LINAC are listed below: 
Type  Manufacture/Year Model: Serial No: Max. Voltage  Status 
LINAC Elekta Limited, /1998 Precise  1310 15MV Functional  
CT Simulator GE Co. Medical System  HP XW CT  CZC 5480458 N/A Functional 
 
Some repair was recently carried out on the LINAC by VAMED and beam calibration was done by the Medical 
Physicist with the assistance of the facility engineer. Result of the recalibration was provided. Quality control 
equipment included a number of Ion Chambers and Electrometers that were last calibrated in October 2005 and 
were overdue for recalibration in October 2007. Also available were Water and Soild Phantoms, Digital 
Barometers, Thermometer, Radiation Check Sources. Radiation Safety Equipment included Survey Meters with 
calibration due date of July 2011. 
2.4.5 Equipment - NHA 
The facility existed before the FGN/VAMED Project and the equipment were installed earlier. Amongst others, 
NHA had the under listed equipment: 
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Table 7:  External Beam Therapy Equipment 
Type  Manufacture/Yr Model No: Serial No: Max. Output Status 
LINAC Elekta Linac /1998 SLi 105500 15MV &18MeV  Not Functional  
Simulator Philips    106764 N/A Not in Operation 
 
Table 8:  Brachytherapy Equipment 
S/N Type Manufacturer/Yr Serial 
No 
Source No: Max. 
activity  
Status  
1 Brachytherapy 
Machine 
CIS-BIO 
International, 2001 
9825 4154,4161-4160-
4150,4159 - 4149, 4158-
4148 
259GBq Functional  
2 Brachytherapy 
Machine 
CIS-BIO 
International, 2001 
9824 4091, 4088-4087, 
4093,4086-4092, 4085-
4089,4090 
259GBq Functional  
 
Quality Assurance Equipment included an Electrometer and 2 Ion Chambers, recently cross calibrated. Also 
available were a digital barometer, thermometer, check sources and dose checker. Radiation safety equipment 
included functional survey meters with valid calibration certificates. 
2.4.6 Equipment - UCH 
The equipment were manufactured in 1987 and so they were not amenable to maintenance. Even though the 
equipment were originally prototype tested to ISO and IEC Standards, both the Cobalt-60 and CT-Simulator 
were all no longer in use and the Cobalt-60 was due for decommissioning. They included Imaging CT 
Simulator; Computerized TPS; Cobalt-60 Machine; Quality Control Equipment; and Radiation Safety 
Equipment. 
Table 9: Specifications of the Imaging Equipment and Co-60 machine 
Type  Manufacturer/Yr Mode/Serial No: Source 
Serial No 
Activity  Status 
Theratron Cobalt-60 
teletherapy machine 
AECL Canada/1987 T78OC/010 S-5353 87.622 TBq 
29/08/2011 
Not in use  
CT Simulator GE Co. Medical System   Therasim-750   Not in use 
TPS Nucletron, Canada Theraplan plus   Not in use 
Quality control equipment included an Ion Chamber and Electrometer even though they were last calibrated in 
July 2006. For its radiation safety equipment UCH had 2 Survey Meters for which there were no available 
technical details or record of calibration. 
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2.4.7 Equipment - EKO 
The equipment and all relevant manuals were available and included Imaging CT Scanner; Computerized TPS; 
Cobalt-60 Machine; Quality Control Equipment; and Radiation Safety Equipment. 
Table 10:  Specifications of the Cobalt-60 Machine (old and new): 
S/N Type Status Manufacturer/Yr Model Serial No Activity; 
24/02/98 
1 Teletherapy  
Machine  
Not in Use Varian-Tem, U.K 
/Feb, 1998 
F100 
Mobaltron 
M113  83.3TBq 
2 New 
Teletherapy  
Machine 
(Phoenix) 
Operational MDS Nordion, , 447  
March Road, Ottawa 
ON K2K IX8, Canada 
Phoenix Teletherapy 
Source S/No: 
Equipment 
S/No:  
Activity 
as @ 
03/08/06 
S-5646 214 131.2 
TBq 
(3535Ci) 
 
 
Table 11:  The specifications of the Imaging Equipment are 
Type Status Manufacture/Yr Model No: Serial 
No: 
Strength  Description  
Bright speed 
CT Scanner 
Undergoing 
repairs 
 GE 
Medical/2008 
Bright speed Edge 
select 5191002 
TRS0088  150 
kVp 
Gantry 8 
slices 
 
The old Cobalt-60 head was still housed within the premises. EKO was unable to decommission the old Cobalt-
60 Head because the company that supplied the source no longer existed. Quality control equipment, 
 which were last calibrated in 2007 included ion chambers. For its radiation safety equipment, EKO had a 
portable dose rate meter for which no calibration certificate was provided. 
2.4.8 Equipment and Radiation sources - ABUTH 
ABUTH had the following equipment and specifications: 
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Table 12: External beam therapy equipment (Co-60 Machine) 
Equipment Source 
form/strength 
Source 
S/No  
Status Manufacturer Model  
Teletherapy Co-60 
Machine Source  
Sealed /215TBq  
(01-08-08) 
028-1445 
 
in 
Use 
Gamma-Service 
GMBH/Germany 
Tk60T03 
 
Table 13:  Brachytherapy Equipment (Cs-137) 
Equipment Source form/strength Source S/No  Status Manufacturer Model  
Brachytherapy 
Machine 
incorporating Cs-
137 Source 
Sealed/1.5133GBq, 
1.5059GBq, .0562GBq, 
3.811GBq, 4.588GBq, 
5.402GBq & 6.105GBq 
51351, 
51352,51353, 
51354,51355, 
51356, 51357 
Functional  CIS Bio 
International, 
France 
CS 
Curietron 
Type B 
 
2.4.9 Equipment - FMCG 
The equipment at FMCG included Imaging; Treatment planning; Treatment delivery (including after loading 
equipment, sources, source storage and transportation, and applicators); Quality assurance; and Radiation safety 
and source handling equipment.  
A CT-Machine was available for imaging, although no detailed information on the equipment was provided. 
Treatment Planning Equipment included a TPS comprised of treatment planning computer, monitor, printer, and 
digitizer. Detailed information on these equipment were not made available. 
Table 14: Specifications of the Treatment delivery Equipment were: 
 
The spent source (Ir-192) had been exported to the source manufacturer via its appointed freight forwarder. 
FMCG had the following Quality Control/Radiation Safety equipment: Brachytherapy Well Chamber, Phantom, 
Electrometer, Seuvey Metres with valid calibration certificates. 
Type  Manufacture/Yr Model No: Serial 
No: 
Source  Source 
Activity 
Status 
HDR-After Loader 
Brachytherapy 
Varian Medical 
System/June 2008 
Gamma Med 
plus ixTM  
0585 Ir-192 Not 
available 
Not 
operational 
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3. Radiation Protection and Quality Assurance Programmes 
The development of Quality Assurance Programme was a weak point of all the facilities. This was due largely to 
the absence of appointed Radiation Safety Officers (RSO) and Radiation Safety Committees (Committee) in 
almost all the facilities. By the provisions of the Regulations, these should be appointed in all radiotherapy 
institutions that handle Categories 1 and 2 sources. They shall coordinate and review the radiation safety and 
protection programmes as well as quality assurance procedures. Their scope should cover other practices that 
could lead to exposure to ionizing radiation in the hospital. Thus radiation protection and safety were largely not 
institutionalized and there was no clearly demonstrable recognition or support for those persons with direct 
responsibility for radiation safety. Consequently, most hospitals had developed some Treatment Procedures and 
QC checks for equipment. They however had not developed a comprehensive QA programme that ensured a 
consistent and safe fulfilment of dose prescription to the target volume with minimal dose to normal tissues and 
minimal exposure to personnel and the public. The main areas for the programme would include clinical 
policies, treatment planning and delivery, QC programme for machine and equipment performance, 
maintenance programmes and investigative procedures for accidental exposures. Very few could provide any 
records of daily, weekly and monthly QC tests done on the equipment. 
4. Personnel and Workplace Monitoring  
All facilities had contractual agreements with accredited Dosimetry Service Providers (DSP) for personnel 
monitoring services. DSP provided all radiation workers with TLD badges, which were periodically recalled and 
analysed to provide evaluation of personnel dose exposure, reported to the radiation employer. Personnel dose 
records were part of the requirements for authorization of practice. However, it was noted that personnel dose 
records were often not current and in some cases, were not even provided. 
In some cases, workplace monitoring was done and records kept. Different methods were used to monitor 
classified areas, including fixed area monitoring. However in general, workplace monitoring was not properly 
done and even when done records were not kept. In many cases, monitoring equipment were not functional or 
out of calibration. Furthermore, absence of comprehensive QA programmes meant that responsibility for 
workplace monitoring was not institutionalized. 
5. Emergency Procedure 
Most facilities had developed emergency plan covering all foreseeable emergency scenarios including what 
could be regarded as incident or accident. Emergency drills and rehearsals were however seldom carried out due 
largely to the lack of responsibility for coordinating emergency response. Most radiation workers did not even 
know about emergency procedures as facilities simply developed emergency plans as part of paper work for 
authorization.  
Policy on informing patients about incidents was not generally clear and the system of reporting incidents to 
hospital management was generally absent. Therefore, it was possible for radiological incidents or accidents to 
pass undetected and unreported. 
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6. Medical Exposure Control 
Medical exposure control was approached differently by facilities. Some used the TPS System and others the 
Manual Calculations to get their dose calculation results. Some even combined both methods. Few centres 
ensured that dose calculations for patients were independently checked by 2 independent Medical Physicists. 
Many did not have this capacity and it was not sure therefore how reliable such calculations would be. 
Patient Identification was largely done using names, age, date of birth, gender, referring physician, consultant in 
charge, hospital ID, Unique Departmental ID, part of body and all treatment procedure. Dose administered were 
recorded in treatment files. Patient photograph were uploaded in the workstation in the Treatment Room. 
Indications and decision to treat should normally be taken by at least 2 Oncologists who had reviewed and 
discussed patients. This was seldom the case as usually no procedure was in place for such review to establish 
justification for radiation therapy and avoid unnecessary irradiation and possible human errors. This was due 
largely to lack of resident Oncologists in many facilities. Despite these, most facilities claimed without evidence 
that their indication and decision to treat included a multidisciplinary medical approach, practice guidelines and 
patient information and consent. This included explaining the benefit and risk of radiation exposure to patients 
before commencement of treatment. Formal consent form to be signed by patients before commencement of 
treatment was developed and available in some of the facilities. 
Usually CT Simulator was used for simulation and this method included automatic transfer from imaging to 
planning. Once the patient data had been acquired, it was then transferred automatically to the TPS for treatment 
planning. However, because of the status of most simulators and TPS, it meant that this system was not 
optimised. The reliability of treatment planning was therefore low. 
Patient identification cards were usually kept at the control room by the side of the monitors and the time 
allocated for the first treatment session and subsequent treatment were clearly indicated on the patient treatment 
file. The Oncologist physically checked the set-up. Treatment delivery was automated with manual verification. 
Patients were monitored by video and audio systems. Follow-up was done by the Oncologists and records were 
usually kept. Follow-up included analysing of complications recorded during the follow-up. All these were 
recorded in the patient treatment file. 
7. Challenges to radiotherapy practice 
At the national level, regulation of radiotherapy practice is relatively new and so is compliance with regulatory 
requirements for radiation safety by radiotherapy centres. Until 2001, there was no legislation on safety of 
exposure to ionizing radiation. NiBIRR and the radiotherapy regulations proceeded later in 2003 and 2006 
respectively. There is also ineffective independence of the regulatory authority leading to inadequate power of 
enforcing the law and safety regulations, especially on government institutions. This made it possible for 
regulated equipment to be imported and installed by government institutions without any license from the 
regulatory authority.At the institutional level, there is usually non-participatory decision making, poor 
management strategic thinking and planning and poor organizational structure for radiation safety. There are 
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situations where centres have almost no capacity for maintenance and imaging and therapy machines all break 
down leading to inability to practice. Systematic analyses of manpower needs and development is generally 
lacking and so, it is possible for centres to be fully equipped but lack the manpower to carry out any practice. In 
most centres, quality management/quality assurance programs exist only on paper, but do not ensure effective 
implementation of activities. These are all symptoms of poor sustainability of practice. 
8. Recommendations 
Government may wish to: 
i address the dearth of oncologists, medical physicists and other professionals in radiotherapy practice as 
a matter of national priority 
ii ensure the passage of the Medical Physics Bill currently before the National Assembly and then also 
establish a national body for the training and certification of medical physicists 
iii ensure that all radiotherapy centres are provided with the appropriate ancillary equipment 
iv direct all radiotherapy centres to comply with the Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection Act of 1995 
and extant Safety Regulations on Radiotherapy. 
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